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Abstract
Social scientists identify two core functions of modern welfare states as redistribution across
(a) socio-economic status groups (Robin Hood) and (b) ‘the lifecycle’ (the piggy bank). But
what is the relative importance of these functions? The answer has been elusive, as the
piggy bank is metaphorical. The intra-personal time-travel of resources it implies is based
on non-quid-pro-quo transfers. In practice, ‘lifecycle redistribution’ must operate through
inter-age-group resource reallocation in cross-section. Since at any time different birth
cohorts live together, ‘resource-productive’ working-aged people are taxed to finance con-
sumption of ‘resource-dependent’ younger and older people. In a novel decomposition anal-
ysis, we study the joint distribution of socio-economic status, age, and respectively (a) all
cash and in-kind transfers (‘benefits’), (b) financing contributions (‘taxes’), and (c) resulting
‘net benefits,’ on a sample of over 400,000 Europeans from 22 EU countries. European wel-
fare states, often maligned as ineffective Robin Hood vehicles riddled with Matthew effects,
are better characterized as inter-age redistribution machines performing a more important
second task rather well: lifecycle consumption smoothing. Social policies serve multiple
goals in Europe, but empirically they are neither primarily nor solely responsible for poverty
relief and inequality reduction.
Introduction: The welfare state as Robin Hood and piggy bank,
beyond metaphor
Welfare states have evolved since their inception in late nineteenth-century Europe into sizable
and resource-consuming institutions. Today, total social spending in Europe takes up around
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28 percent of GDP on average and around 66 percent of total government revenue, and it
affects many aspects, and every stage, of citizens’ lives. But what do welfare states mostly do?
Two social science approaches have been dominant in answering this question. Standard eco-
nomic accounts view welfare states’ primary role as resolving market failures, not least because
of the state’s unique ability to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection by pooling risks widely
and making participation obligatory [1–4]. Barr [1] pointed out that alongside the welfare
state’s familiar redistributive function is its efficiency role in areas where, because of market
failures, private markets would produce inefficiently or not at all.
Markets fail whenever property rights are incomplete (imperfect excludability or non-trans-
ferability), when information and transaction costs are too high, or when the parties are unable
to agree upon the terms of exchange due to structural bargaining problems. As a result, private
actors cannot enter mutually fruitful transactions such as insurance against the risk of unem-
ployment, disability, and health deterioration because of asymmetric information, but also
moral hazard (unemployment and medical insurance) and probabilities too close to 1 to insure
(medical insurance); they cannot attain optimal levels of expenditures on education (because
of externalities on the outcomes, but also imperfect capital markets); and they cannot obtain
insurance against the unpredictability of longevity (because of the uninsurability of related
risks such as future inflation).
Standard sociological and public policy accounts, in turn, view the welfare state as a political
Robin Hood of sorts; a redeemer of markets and families. Welfare states, in this view, are ana-
lyzed primarily as a tool for poverty relief, redistribution from higher socio-economic status
(SES) groups to lower-SES groups, and inequality reduction. The classic question here has
been to what degree various types of welfare states perform this task effectively (e.g., [5–7]; for
a critical synthesis, see [8]). Strictly speaking, the efficiency function implies that a welfare
state of some sort would be necessary even if all poverty could magically be removed (Barr
[1]). This offers a re-interpretation of the finding that the beneficiaries of welfare state benefits
include the middle class [5–7]. Others in the sociology and public policy tradition have added
that welfare states, more generally, temper the social costs of market forces through wider
social citizenship rights and reduce citizens’ material dependence on markets [9,10]. The wel-
fare state, according to this view, ‘decommodifies’ people: it ‘maintain[s] a livelihood without
reliance on the market’ and it does so ‘as a matter of right’ [10]. In a fundamental new focus on
the household economy, Esping-Andersen [11–13] later emphasized how welfare states can
also ‘defamilialize:’ they can render individuals, especially women, more independent from
their family.
After their initial formulations, both approaches have incorporated a lifecycle perspective.
The start of the social investment paradigm from the late 1990s onward has refocused the
attention of sociologists and policy researchers on how, early on in the lifecycle, ‘predistribu-
tive’ social policies such as education, lifelong learning, and activation can boost individuals’
ability to adjust to changing market demands and to earn market incomes, thereby preventing
many social problems (‘preparing’) rather than dealing with them (‘repairing’) later [11,12,14]
but see [15,16]. Birnbaum et al. [17] measure how social policies, seen as ‘generational welfare
contracts,’ balance program replacement rates across different lifecycle stages. And in econom-
ics, while Barr [1] identified the separate rich-to-poor redistributive and efficiency functions of
the welfare state, Barr [18] famously added a further key purpose: redistribution ‘over the life-
cycle.’ For the rich-to-poor and lifecycle redistribution functions, Barr [18] introduced respec-
tively the ‘Robin Hood’ and ‘piggy bank’ terms. The piggy bank is made necessary by a
fundamental, one might say universal, lifecycle consumption financing problem, which mem-
bers of each successive generation need to solve. There is a discrepancy in the typical paths of
labor income and consumption [19,20]. Productivity and earning powers are heavily
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concentrated in the middle of the lifecycle—a hump-shaped curve—but people have to con-
sume in childhood and in old age, too, when they do not earn much primary income. Accord-
ing to the piggy bank interpretation, a significant part of the welfare state consists of enabling
individuals to make transfers between ‘their own selves’ at different stages of their lives.
But which of these two core functions ismore important—Robin Hood or piggy bank? Ele-
mentary though this question might seem for any proper understanding of how welfare states
operate, there is no straightforward research design to answer it. The reason is that the piggy
bank is largely metaphorical. The ‘lifecycle redistribution’ it entails is a legally and methodo-
logically elusive concept. The time-travel of resources implied by the piggy bank’s ‘lifecycle
redistribution’ is not a well-defined system of detectable, quid-pro-quo exchanges imparting
reliable and legally enforceable property rights connecting the same person over time. Two
concepts of ‘lifecycle redistribution’ are invoked here: redistribution between first, different
stages of one’s own life (one’s successive selves) and second, groups of different ages at a given
moment (age groups in cross-section) (e.g. [21–23]. The first concept can be seen as the indi-
viduals’ objective, the second as the mechanism by which the welfare state assists the achieve-
ment of that objective [24]. As Samuelson [25] noted, in reality, no direct intertemporal intra-
personal links (the first concept) can be established. Simply put, short of Robinson Crusoe
solutions (storing current production for one’s own future consumption by stockpiling bricks
or non-perishable goods, say, tuna cans), there cannot be any intertemporal reallocations
between one single person’s selves over his/her lifetime withoutmaking inter-age group trans-
actions. The only alternative is cross-sectional: to exchange one’s current production for a
claim on future production by younger generations (the second concept). This can be done
either by saving to accumulate assets to be sold later to younger generations, or by obtaining a
promise of a share of future production [18,24,26].
To illustrate this, consider a classic example of ostensible piggy bank redistribution ‘over
the lifecycle’: pay-as-you-go pensions. The transfers that pension contributors send (meta-
phorically) to fund their consumption as future pensioners are, technically, a legally underspe-
cified claim on future consumption, to be financed later by younger others. In practice,
pension contributions are used to finance pension benefits for today’s pensioners (older gener-
ations), with the expectation that these contributions establish some later claim on future con-
sumption that will then have to be financed by contributions of future workers (younger
generations). Pay-as-you-go schemes (states) and private saving or fully funded schemes (mar-
kets) are simply alternative mechanisms (‘promises’ versus ‘assets’) to organize claims on
younger generations’ future output–to solve the consumption smoothing problem [18,26]. In
both cases, lifecycle redistribution operates through cross-sectional reallocations between dif-
ferent age groups.
The particular solution offered by welfare states uses taxes and promises to exploit the sec-
tional nature of the lifecycle. At any given point in time, people who have been born in differ-
ent years (different cohorts) live together (as age groups) in the same society. Hence there are
always net ‘resource productive’ people (typically the working-aged) who can be taxed to
finance net transfers downward to children and upward to the elderly [27,28]. Welfare state
entitlement claims are based not on classical legal contracts but rather on a ‘relational con-
tract,’ a form of intertemporal trust that successive generations (or the future governments
representing them) will ‘honor’ their ‘promise’ or ‘obligation’ [4,25,29]. The frequently
observed changes over time in pension generosity or benefit formulas, for instance, are just a
manifestation of a new political equilibrium between taxpayers and recipients due to changed
economic-fiscal circumstances [30,31].
In other words, the welfare state solves the endemic problem of lifecycle consumption
smoothing given inherently incomplete contracts about the future by arranging resource
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reallocations between age groups in cross-section. This article reconceptualizes the piggy bank
function accordingly and then proceeds to empirically assess its importance relative to the
Robin Hood function in a first-ever analysis of the joint distribution of socio-economic status,
age and, respectively, (a) all cash and in-kind transfers (‘benefits’), (b) financing contributions
(‘taxes’), and (c) resulting ‘net benefits.’ We investigate a sample of over 400,000 Europeans
from 22 European Union member states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
emburg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. These
represent 82 percent of the European Union’s population and all major institutional welfare
state types, in 2010. The article is organized as follows. We discuss our methodological
approach in the next section. We then introduce our model and present the three-dimensional
distribution surfaces of all cash and in-kind welfare benefits, the taxes that finance them, and
the resulting net benefits for 22 European welfare states by SES and age. We then quantify the
relative importance of the two explanatory variables in terms of their average marginal effects
and the Shapley value of their contribution to the explained variance. The last section discusses
wider implications for how to understand and evaluate social policy.
Methodological approach: Separating Robin Hood and piggy bank
in cross-section
Methodologically, social scientists have typically inferred the welfare state’s ‘lifecycle redistri-
bution’ function from the difference between lifetime inequality and period inequality. If
inequalities appear to be significantly smaller among lifetime incomes than they are in any
cross-section, this is then inferred to be the result of a piggy bank in operation. Precisely such
findings have been published for a handful of countries so far. The tax-transfer system has
been found to entail significantly lower lifetime inequalities, as compared to period inequalities
in the US [32], the UK [33–35], the Netherlands [36], Ireland [37], Germany [38], Australia
[39] and Sweden [40,41]. Other studies discuss the difference between period and lifetime
inequalities without relating it to tax-and-transfer systems [8,42].
This common methodological approach carries significant limitations, however. Direct
cross-country comparison of results is difficult (rare examples are [43] and [44], both compar-
ing only two countries). Measuring intertemporal effects requires a time-series of retrospective
data, which is only available for a few countries. Even if such data are at hand, future lifecycle
sections have to be simulated, implying numerous idiosyncratic assumptions and weakening
comparability. More importantly, the design of separating the Robin Hood and piggy bank
functions by comparing period and lifetime inequalities offers only indirect and incidental evi-
dence. The observation that lifetime inequalities are smaller than period inequalities may not
even be ascribable to the piggy bank role. In general, the measured level of inequality is sensi-
tive to the length of the accounting period. As a general rule, the longer the period, the lower
the inequalities. This is due, first, to the oscillation of individual incomes: the longer the
accounting period (a year versus a week), the smaller the inequalities as there will be a reversal
to one’s own mean [45]. It is due, second, to the well-established hump-shaped pattern of
income over the lifecycle [46]. Consequently, lifetime inequalities can be assumed to be lower
than cross-section inequalities, without any need to refer to how the piggy bank operates. In
other words, one cannot adequately capture the piggy bank function based on a design that
compares lifetime inequalities with cross-sectional inequalities.
Rather than engaging in single-country microsimulation over the lifecycle or in a meta-
analysis of hard-to-compare country results, this article therefore approaches the two-function
separation problem without recourse to intertemporal data. Estimating the relative role of
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inter-status and inter-age redistribution in determining welfare benefits, taxes, and net benefits
requires the analysis of their respective joint distributions with both SES and age. Age and
income (or wealth) have frequently been used simultaneously in the decomposition of inequal-
ities since [46] first isolated the age component of inequality indexes [47]. The dependent vari-
able of these decomposition models has typically been some measure of (income or status)
inequality. But similar decomposition analyses using access to welfare benefits, taxes, and the
resulting net welfare benefits as their dependent variables, as we do here, have to our best
knowledge not been attempted. Many studies hold some measure of inequality or poverty as
the dependent variable and separate the effects of various components of the welfare state (e.g.,
[48]), but here we are interested in keeping the incidence of taxes or transfers on the left-hand
side of the equation. There are large bodies of empirical research on transfer incidence by
income, age, household type, or other individual characteristics, but the overwhelming major-
ity are uni-dimensional, measuring the effect of a single explanatory variable. Some studies
analyze distributions in several dimensions, but they do it separately, one after the other (e.g.,
[49]), and only a few discuss the incidence of transfers and taxes using age and SES simulta-
neously, such as generational accounting by gender (e.g., [50]) or by education level (e.g.,
[51]).
We use Household Budget Surveys (HBS), the European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU SILC), and the European Health Interview Survey (EHIS). S1 File
describes our data, the assumptions made in the analysis, and definitions of cash and in-kind
benefits, direct and indirect taxes, and our measure of socio-economic status. Our welfare
‘benefits’ cover the full range of what is commonly considered as the welfare state: all benefits
included under the UN’s Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) functions 7
(‘health’), 9 (‘education’), and 10 (‘social protection’) in the national accounting categories of
‘final consumption expenditures’ and ‘social benefits other than social transfers in-kind’ (all at
the level of the general government). Effectively, the analysis covers the entire public spending
category of ‘individual consumption expenditures,’ those for which specific beneficiaries can
be assigned. The other COFOG categories (general public services, defense, public order and
safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community amenities, and
recreation, culture, and religion) finance ‘collective consumption expenditures’ or pure public
goods that are age- and SES-neutral. Our measure of SES, based on the standard index used by
the OECD [52], is a composite indicator of education, occupational status, and home posses-
sions (material deprivation and housing) at the household level. The calculations were
repeated using alternative SES measures (see S1A and S1B Table).
Analysis: The relative importance of age and socio-economic
status
We apply a multivariate regression framework to compare the relative importance of age and
SES in explaining differences in the receipt of benefits, the taxes and social contributions
financing them, and the resulting net benefits. The statistical literature differentiates between
importance based on impact (change in the outcome variable in response to a unit change in
the predictor variable) and dispersion (variance of the outcome variable explained by the
regression equation that is attributable to a predictor variable). The former is measured using
regression coefficients; the latter is based on changes in the R2 due to the stepwise inclusion or
exclusion of predictor variables (e.g., [53]). In our basic specification, we apply ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions with age, status and their interaction on the right-hand side of the
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bIijAgei � Statusj þ ε; ð1Þ
where Y represents benefits, taxes, or net benefits, respectively, in the separate models; Agei
and Statusj are dummy variables representing categories of age and SES (i, j = 2,. . ., 10), and
the βs are regression coefficients, so that βAs are the main effects of age βSs are the main effects
for status and βIs are the interaction coefficients.
We use categorized versions of age and SES to allow for non-linearities in the effects of the
variables. To avoid that the categorization of the two explanatory variables affects the between-
group variation, we use age-deciles and status-deciles. This guarantees that the two marginal
distributions are the same (see S2 Table). The interaction of age and SES is included in the
model to allow for age and SES effects to differ by categories of the other variable. In the basic
models presented here, we use only the two independent variables of interest. Control vari-
ables and country dummies are added in the robustness tests (see S2 File and S4 Table in S2
File). Our analysis does not aim for as complete an explanation as possible of the dependent
variables. Rather, our purpose here is to compare the relative importance of age and SES by
their regression coefficients and their contribution to the explained variance of the dependent
variables. The correlation of age and SES is positive, but this affects only the standard errors of
the estimates. Regression coefficient estimates remain unbiased in the presence of
multicollinearity.
We pool the samples of 22 countries resulting in a European sample of over 400,000 indi-
viduals. As a first step, the national samples are reweighed so that each country is represented
with the same number of people. Then, the national values for benefits and taxes are re-scaled
in order to make them comparable. We follow the National Transfer Accounts method [54]
and divide the national values of benefits and taxes by the national per capita labor income of
the age-group 30–49. This re-scaling technique filters out the effect of differences in income
level across countries, and it is less arbitrary than alternatives based on consumption baskets.
The pooling procedure matches the corresponding national age-status groups. It preserves the
properties of the national welfare systems with regard to access to benefits and contribution to
their finances. However, it does not offer uniform age-brackets or status division lines. For eas-
ier interpretation, we refer to age-groups below by actual ages, but these are approximations
based on simple country-averages (for details of sample pooling, see the S1 File). All results
presented here are calculated from the pooled sample. We also repeated all calculations sepa-
rately for each national sample and computed simple averages. This alternative method did
not produce any substantive changes to our findings.
Results
Three-dimensional distribution surfaces
Figs 1–3 show, respectively, the distributions of group averages for benefits, taxes, and net ben-
efits in three-dimensional spaces. In each Fig, the two horizontal axes are age groups and SES
categories. For better visibility, the charts are rotated. In addition, in S1 Fig we present these
same findings in the form of two-dimensional line charts with separate lines for each of the ten
SES groups. The full tables of the distribution surfaces for these group averages are presented
in S3 Table. In addition, for completeness, tables of the regression surfaces drawn by the linear
predictions are shown in S4A–S4C Table.
The relief map of welfare benefits (Fig 1) resembles a canyon with a river flowing down-
stream toward the reader: the right riverbank is on Fig 1‘s left, and vice versa. There is a slight
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upward right riverbank for the young, especially the second-youngest decile (roughly consist-
ing of teenagers). Then there is a wide riverbed among the working-aged (deepest among the
fifth to seventh age deciles), and a steep left riverbank among the elderly (three oldest deciles).
Fig 1. Per capita welfare benefits (cash and in-kind) by age and SES in the European Union. Source: Authors’
calculation. Notes: Calculated from a pooled sample of over 400,000 individuals from 22 EU countries. National values
are re-scaled based on the average labor income of 30-49-year-olds. The image is rotated.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.g001
Fig 2. Per capita taxes and contributions financing welfare benefits by age and SES in the European Union.
Sources and notes as in Fig 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.g002
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The river flows entirely above-ground: all age groups and all status groups receive welfare ben-
efits in Europe. Five notable things stand out visually. First, when it comes to welfare benefits
receipt, age is more prominent than SES. Iso-age and iso-SES lines clearly illustrate this visu-
ally. With few exceptions, the iso-age lines run almost parallel with the SES axis. By contrast,
the iso-status lines significantly deviate from running parallel to the age axis. In fact, second,
the left riverbank rises both more steeply and higher: the oldest three age deciles receive signifi-
cantly more welfare benefits than any of the younger deciles. In numerical terms, the average
10-to-18-year-old European receive more than three times as much as the average 27-to-33
and 34-to-40-year-old (the two age groups who receive the least). Meanwhile, the average per-
son in the oldest age group gets almost six times as much as 27-to-40-year-olds. By contrast,
among the SES groups, the largest difference is a mere 30% between the lowest and the highest
values. In other words, when it comes to the transfer arm of the tax-and-transfer machinery,
Europe consists of strongly elderly-oriented ‘benefit welfare states’ [55,56].
Third, there is only a minimal variance in the access to benefits by SES among children and
the youth, especially among the 10-to-18-year-olds. All status groups receive similar welfare
benefits; among the youngest children, there is even a slightly positive correlation between
access and status. Fourth, the benefit side of European welfare states is, to a small extent, pro-
gressive among working-age people. The river flows downstream leisurely: after an initial cas-
cade from the lowest to the second decile, its slope descends more gently from the second to
the fifth decile among working-age people, and it becomes practically flat in the highest five
SES deciles. However, fifth, the differences grow large and positively correlated with status in
old age: we see a crease in the shape of the riverbank. Among the oldest-old, the highest-SES
group receives 70 percent more benefits than the lowest-SES group.
Fig 2 reveals an altogether very different picture: not a canyon with a gently downstream
flowing river, but a steep subterranean waterfall. European welfare states are distinctly progres-
sive (redistributive across status) only through their taxation arm. This finding is a corollary to
Fig 3. Per capita net welfare benefits (benefits minus taxes) by age and SES in the European Union. Sources and
notes as in Fig 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.g003
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the result by Hills [34] for the UK, who showed that the lifecycle consumption financing aspect
was considerably larger than the Robin Hood effect. The tax side in Fig 2 shows more substan-
tial SES effects than the benefits side in Fig 1. Children only pay indirect taxes, which limits
their contributions. Except for the two highest-status groups, more or less the same applies to
the elderly. However, in contrast to the benefits side, here the iso-age lines also dip steeply in
working age, especially in the highest SES decile. Yet even here, age matters crucially as well.
As the iso-SES lines show, it is the working-aged who pay most taxes in every status group.
Lastly, Fig 3 visually represents the resulting overall picture of net welfare state benefits
(benefits minus taxes) for our 22 European welfare states. We see a canyon, again with steep
left and right riverbanks, but the river now goes underground and becomes yet steeper there.
Five notable observations stand out. First, age dwarfs SES also in net terms. In each SES cate-
gory, the oldest age group receives the most net welfare benefits (and the second oldest gets the
second-largest sum except for the highest SES group). Second and third, once below ground,
the river turns fast into a waterfall that cascades particularly steeply among the middle-aged
higher SES groups. All age groups below 18 and all age groups above 63 are net welfare state
recipients in every SES category. Fourth, in net terms, European welfare states are progressive,
almost Rawlsian. In the lowest status category, all age groups are net beneficiaries. Fifth, the
lowest status decile is the highest net beneficiary in all age groups between 10 and 62.
Average marginal effects
The model in Eq (1) generates regression coefficients that draw regression surfaces similar to
the distribution surfaces above. We present the series of age effects by status deciles and the
series of status effects by age deciles in S4A–S4C Table. Here we focus only on the average mar-
ginal effects. In the three panels of Fig 4, we show the average marginal effects, respectively, of
age across all status groups and of status across all age groups. The age coefficients, depicted by
a solid line, go from the youngest age group (the reference category) to the oldest; the status
coefficients (dotted line) go from the lowest status level (the reference category) to the highest.
To help orientation, the scales of the vertical axes are the same, although the three panels depict
Fig 4. Average marginal effects of socio-economic status and age groups in the benefits, taxes, and net benefits
models (reference category, age = 1 (youngest), SES = 1 (lowest)). Note: Based on regression models including only
age and SES dummies and their interaction as explanatory variables.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.g004
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different segments of the coordinate system. (For full regression tables for the three models,
see S5 Table).
Fig 4 statistically confirms our previous visual results. European benefits states (upper left
panel) are heavily elderly-oriented but almost neutral in terms of SES. Tax states (upper right
panel) are progressive by SES, but, even more so, a burden on the middle-aged. Overall, in net
terms (lower panel), European welfare states are status-redistributive still. But, more domi-
nantly, they are a vehicle for taxing the middle-aged and financing the youngest (bottom two)
age groups and, even more so, the elderly (oldest two) age groups.
Table 1 presents three indicators to summarize the differences in the coefficients of age and
SES: the standard deviation, the sum of the absolute values, and the range of the coefficients.
In the benefits model, the standard deviation of the SES coefficients is a mere 0.02; the sum of
their absolute values is 0.21, and their range is 0.05 (see Table 1). The corresponding figures
for age are 0.18, 1.38, and 0.50. In other words, on the benefit side of welfare states, age matters
greatly, while SES does not.
On the tax revenue side, both variables prove to be relevant, although age is clearly more
important. On average, the age coefficients are further away from the reference category than
are the SES coefficients, while their standard deviations and ranges are roughly similar. In the
resulting net benefits model, lastly, age again is more important than SES. Net benefits differ
more between age groups than between SES groups. All in all, European welfare states, as tax-
and-transfer machines in net terms, redistribute more across age lines than across status lines.
Explained variance
By the alternative interpretation of relative importance, a variable is more important than
another if it explains more of the variance. Here, we use the Shapley method to study this ver-
sion of variable importance [57]. In the Shapley-value decomposition, the contribution of an
explanatory variable to the explained variance of the dependent variable is equal to this vari-
able’s marginal effect on the goodness of fit of the model (R2). This marginal effect, in turn, is
defined as the change in the R2 if the variable in question is eliminated from the regression.
When there are several explanatory variables, the marginal effect of a variable depends on the
order of elimination. The Shapley value of a regressor is the average of its marginal effects over
all possible elimination orderings [53,58]. A particular advantage of the Shapley-method is
that it decomposes the interaction term of two variables [58]. When the interaction of two var-
iables is considered, the process of repeated eliminations includes the elimination of the inter-
action term, too. In this way, the contribution of the interaction term is split between the
interacting variables, and the interaction term does not appear as a separate item in the regres-
sion table. The three-dimensional figures above suggest interactions between age and SES
since the SES effect is visibly different in working age and old age.
We present the results of the decomposition exercise in Table 2. It contains percentages of
the total variance of benefits, taxes, and net benefits, respectively, accounted for by age and
SES, as well as the relative contributions of these variables to the variance explained just by the
Table 1. Sum of absolute values, range, and standard deviation of the average marginal effects of age and SES in models of benefits, taxes, and net benefits.
Benefits Taxes Net benefits
SES Age SES Age SES Age
Standard deviation 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.29
Sum of absolute values 0.21 1.38 1.53 2.36 1.71 2.95
Range 0.05 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.77
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.t001
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two of them. The analysis again confirms the conjectures of Section 2. Age is much more
important in explaining access to welfare state benefits, and SES is in fact, irrelevant here. On
the tax side, the two variables are both relatively important, but age still explains more of the
variance. As for net welfare benefits, the analysis of the contributions to the explained variance
gives a similar picture to the analysis of coefficients: age is more important, accounting for 24
percent of the total variance in net benefits explained (and 78 percent of the variance explained
by both variables), compared to only 7 percent for socio-economic status (or 22 percent of
joint variance).
These results are robust when the model is completed with additional controls for gender,
household size, migration status, the degree of urbanization and country dummies. S6 Table
presents similar summary statistics of the standardized regression coefficients as above (stan-
dard deviation and mean of the coefficients’ absolute values). The additional models show that
age again dominates the benefits model, and SES again remains marginal. If any of our previ-
ous conclusions has to be modified, it is about the tax model. When gender and household size
are included in the model, SES is even less on par with age. The latter is clearly more important
in all three ways of measurement. It is also evident that none of the control variables is nearly
as important as age.
In sum, the analysis based on explained variance confirms that European welfare states
function as an intermediary between overlapping generations that seek to finance consump-
tion over their lifecycle by exploiting the opportunities offered by that very overlap–
contemporaries tend to be of different ages. More specifically still, welfare states serve as a
channel through which working-age people of higher status support people of inactive age
across all SES groups. Only the taxation arm of European welfare states, not their benefits arm,
is distinctly progressive (redistributing strongly from high to low SES). Even here, redistribu-
tion across age groups is more important. But in terms of their benefits arm and, as a result,
also in terms of the overall picture of net benefits, redistribution between age groups is clearly
much more important than between socio-economic status groups.
Conclusions and wider implications: How we evaluate social
policies
European welfare states, first and foremost, are not status equalizers of sorts, but lifecycle redis-
tribution machines in cross-section. This finding carries multiple wider implications for public
policy. First, it affects the yardsticks we employ in targeting analysis. Far from limiting itself to
socio-economic status, the analysis should be extended to targeting by age. How would this
look? If the primary aim of social policy is to reallocate resources from working-age groups to
children and the elderly, what does (mis-)targeting even mean? Let us again consider old-age
pensions as an example. As a tool for mitigating poverty, public pension systems may (or may
not) be effective, but they may also be, in a significant sense, inefficient, in that they overshoot.
Table 2. Contribution to the explained variance by age and SES for benefits, taxes, and net benefits (Shapley-value decomposition of the R2).













SES 1 5 10 43 7 22
Age 25 95 14 57 24 78
Total 26 100 25 100 31 100
Note: Absolute contributions sum to model R2. Relative contributions sum to 100%x.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760.t002
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Pension benefits may raise the income of elderly people above the poverty line, but as an inter-
age program, they may still be mistargeted if paid to people who are not yet old and/or whose
productivity is still competitive. Effective retirement ages in our 22 EU countries have
increased from 61.1 to 62.5 years for women and from 62.8 to 64.1 years for men between
2010 in 2018. This indicates a smaller degree of such mistargeting today, albeit with significant
scope for improvement, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe.
Second, a perennially predominant question in contemporary social policy analysis–indeed,
a key yardstick for judging ‘how successful are European welfare states’ [5]—is to what degree
various welfare state types reduce poverty and inequality. Since Le Grand’s pioneering work
[6] demonstrating the prevalence of mistargeting, it has become routine for national statistical
services and international agencies such as the World Bank, the OECD or Eurostat to measure
the distributional effects of welfare programs by income. In actual practice, higher-SES groups
often receive as much or more in transfers and services than lower-SES groups–‘not-only-the-
poor’ paradoxes or ‘Matthew effects’ [7,16,35], yet moving away from precise targeting by SES
may paradoxically result in less, not more, poverty relief and inequality reduction ([59,60] but
see [61,62]. Even social investment programs are not exempt from Matthew effects and may
not much diminish inequality and poverty—a new ‘paradox of social investment’ [15,16].
However, our observation that welfare states are neither primarily nor solely responsible for
poverty relief and income equalization should absolve or deflect some of the mistargeting and
ineffectiveness blame leveled at them.
What may appear in univariate (‘SES’) models to be a dysfunctional Robin Hood state,
badly targeted and riddled with Matthew effects, turns out in bivariate (‘SES-and-age’) models
to be an inter-age-group resource reallocation state performing amore important second task
rather well: lifecycle consumption smoothing. Well-meaning, even well-targeted, policies to
reduce poverty or inequality in cross-section might lead to significant inter-cohort inequalities
within societies, of the kind documented by [63] or [64]. Inequality measured in cross-section
is always in part the result of age-specific, hump-shaped, productivity [20,32,65]. Hence, differ-
ences in the age composition of society, as captured in population pyramids, affect cross-sec-
tional inequality irrespective of how welfare states operate.
Third, none of the above serves to question poverty alleviation and inequality reduction as
worthy societal goals. Our finding that European welfare states are primarily inter-age reallo-
cation machines does not imply, normatively, that public policies ought not to be used for pov-
erty relief and inequality reduction. Rather, other forms of government activity—non-social
policies—could also be drafted into that same societal effort and be judged accordingly. For
example, road-construction projects are typically discussed exclusively in terms of technical
efficiency. Yet infrastructure networks strongly impact equality, too: highways favor the resi-
dents of cities, where the rich live; but investing in lower-level road networks and public trans-
port in the countryside brings greater benefits to the poor in relative terms. There is an
abundance of similar examples: safety regulations, air pollution standards, public investment
in air traffic or exchange rate policy, and carbon taxes, to name just a few [66]. The fuel tax
increase announced by the Macron-Philippe government in France in 2018 led to massive and
months-long gilets jaunes (yellow vests) protests for this reason. Though it was not interpreted
as such by experts and politicians, this non-social policy was popularly perceived as having sig-
nificant regressive effects–and resisted as such. These examples serve to illustrate the unspoken
and unquestioned division of labor between various types of government intervention. Since
they primarily operate as an inter-age reallocation system, social policies should not be singled
out as the sole institution to shoulder the blame for imperfectly alleviating poverty and mitigat-
ing inequality. If these goals are deemed societally worthy, other non-social forms of govern-
ment intervention could also be judged according to the same yardstick.
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Fourth, our findings point to the need to reinterpret what welfare states mostly do. For
many, welfare states are viewed as the primary remedy of poverty and inequalities. For others,
they are a market-correcting institution, stepping in where markets fail, and to decommodify
individuals. For yet others, they make individuals less resource-dependent on their families.
This article does not take issue with these functions. Welfare states have evolved for multiple
historical reasons to perform multiple functions. But our analysis does suggest, on empirical
grounds, a shift in analytical focus. The underlying problem is not states versusmarkets and/or
families. Esping-Andersen’s fundamental plea [11] for a new analytical focus on how states,
markets and families interact as triads (regimes) to produce ‘welfare’ applies with equal force
to lifecycle redistribution. Welfare states should primarily be viewed as an institutionalized
way to solve a logically and historically prior problem confronting every member (irrespective
of age, gender, or ideology) of every generation (irrespective of period) in every multi-genera-
tional society (irrespective of riches, welfare regime type, political economy model, or even age
or degree of democracy): the fundamental lifecycle consumption financing problem [19,27].
All societies need to solve this problem because of the discrepancy between the bell curve of
labor income and the flatter and more linear consumption curve over the lifecycle.Welfare
state societies specifically solve it through the inter-age-group resource transfers of the piggy
bank in cross-section: surplus resources are taxed away from the working-aged to finance
childhood and old age. European welfare societies engage in a division of labor to solve the
problem: they are elderly-oriented welfare states relying on strongly child-oriented families
[67–69]. Our general result obtains everywhere, even though there are country-specific differ-
ences within Europe as can be expected. For instance, in the non-Anglo-Saxon part of our
sample, taxes are concentrated in working age with a rather linear slope according to status
that turns somewhat steeper in the highest status group. In the UK, this slope really becomes
much steeper in the last status groups. And in Ireland, the highest status group is taxed
markedly more than any other status groups. Nevertheless, the strong status effect is combined
with a strong age effect in these Anglo-Saxon welfare states, too. Our results are empirical and
pertain strictly speaking only to the 22 European societies studied here. Other societies solve
the same lifecycle consumption smoothing problem otherwise. For instance, in the United
States, markets dwarf government in financing old age [70]. While contemporary tax burdens
on working-age people are unsurprisingly much higher in ‘statist’ Sweden compared to ‘famili-
alist’ Taiwan, the combined weight of net public and net private transfers is nearly identical in
both countries [28]. Swedish workers (and Europeans more generally) pay taxes to their gov-
ernment and trust it to provide for their parents; a heavily socialized solution. Taiwanese
workers (and Confucian cultures more generally) provide for their own family members
directly; a heavily familialized solution [71].
European welfare states solve the problem of lifecycle consumption smoothing given
incomplete contracts about the future by, as it were, sequentially sidestepping the future. But
of course, the shadow of the future looms large, in the form of ever-contingent power balances
between successive generations over time. Younger generations must eternally follow older
generations–and be willing, politically, to finance the latter’s consumption [29,72]. The key
requirement for the continued functioning of any intertemporal redistribution vehicle is pro-
ductivity-adjusted demographic continuity. As Samuelson put it [27: 482], pay-as-you-go
schemes are a claim on ‘the community’s indestructible real tax base.’ At a fundamental level
therefore, lifecycle consumption financing depends less on property rights or state versus mar-
ket solutions than on how successive cohorts of voters use their relative political power. Future
policy research should conceptualize intergenerational justice more consistently in terms of
inter-cohort resource equality and policy sustainability. Theoretical research could fruitfully
model political sustainability and the forward and backward linkages that bind overlapping
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cohorts [73–75]. For, in a very real sense, retirement reform must begin with babies [12] and
social security is good for the environment [76]. In a final paradox, then, a clearer understand-
ing of the cross-sectional operation of the piggy bank leads to a more urgent focus on time and
the generations.
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https://doi.org/10.4081/gh.2013.72 PMID: 24258901
PLOS ONE Welfare states as lifecycle redistribution machines
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255760 August 25, 2021 17 / 18
57. Shorrocks AF. Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a unified framework based on the
Shapley value. J Econ Inequal. 2013; 11:99–126.
58. Israeli O. A Shapley-Based Decomposition of the R-Square of a Linear Regression. J Econ Inequal
[Internet]. 2007; 5(2):199–212. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10888-006-9036-6.
59. Korpi W, Palme J. The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions,
Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries. Am Sociol Rev. 1998; 63(5):661–87.
60. Gugushvili D, Laenen T. Two decades after Korpi and Palme’s “paradox of redistribution”: What have
we learned so far and where do we take it from here? J Int Comp Soc Policy. 2021;1–16.
61. Kenworthy L. Progress for the Poor. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2011.
62. Marx I, Salanauskaite L, Verbist G. For the Poor, but Not Only the Poor: On Optimal Pro-Poorness in
Redistributive Policies. Soc Forces. 2016; 95(1–24).
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